Friday, October 27, 2006

Sorry to disappoint you

… but I won't be writing the report entitled The Politics of Polarization, Propaganda and Peaceful Coexistence, although I have set up a template for it and developed a rough idea on what observations I might want to put into it.

Writing has never been my cup of tea. And my depression certainly has not helped. As I mentioned before, many times I felt hopelessly that my writing could never catch up with the development of my story. Indeed, while I was in Ottawa, I even tried to persuade a university student to write for me.

Of course, my recent awful experience, which taught me that words are subject to misinterpretations that can lead to unintended consequences, weighed in heavily in my decision.

Looking deeper, I think the root of my problem lay in the fact that I never enjoyed my experience of the past two years. Yes, I exhibited a sense of self-deprecating humor from time to time. But that's my way to tell the world that "I was down, but not out". It was a show of resilience in the face of overwhelming obstacles.

I hope people will come to realize that my life as reflected in these blogs - with all these protesting, fasting and especially political writing - was not the norm. When I started my journey more than two years ago, I did not expect that I would have to do so many difficult things. I did them, simply because they were the right things to do. As such, I have no regret.

Still, life in the past couple of years feels like a detour to me. What I really want is to get my life back and to be able to learn in person from my hero Mr. Warren Buffett. Nothing will make me happier.

Through both his life and his work, Mr. Buffett set an example for the whole world to follow. In particular, Chinese people can learn tremendously from him in their pursuit of economic transformation. Berkshire's economic principles of operation and Mr. Buffett's business philosophy represent the best of capitalism and will be extremely helpful in dealing with some of the "quality of development" issues that exist at this stage of China's economic development and bringing China's global competitiveness to the next level.

So, if you all would excuse me, I think I have something else to catch up with.

 

Tuesday, October 03, 2006

Where is my sense of humor?

I saw Mr. Thomas L. Friedman over at the New York Times asking that question the other day.

Although I am not sure if Mr. Friedman was aware that he was not the first person who noticed that I had "long ago ceased to be amusing", when a big-name columnist like him raises a question, I'd better give him a prompt answer. So here I am writing again, with five tons of reluctance.

First of all, I'd like to thank Mr. Friedman for noticing that I did have a sense of self-deprecating humor before. Evidently for me, those were the better days when even President Bush got infected with it during his visit to Canada.

I lost my sense of humor - and part of myself - because of what I learned about the Bomb. I can't pinpoint an exact date for it. But the significant date was around mid-March.

What I knew about the Bomb before mid-March?

Very little. All I knew was that the Bomb is a horrible thing and anyone contemplating using it is crazy.

Below is the timeline related to the subject prior to mid-March:

20050714 (appr): General Zhu's comments

General Zhu said that China should attack U.S. with nuclear bombs in case a military conflict over Taiwan.

I thought he was crazy.

I thought about voicing my opinion but could not find an appropriate platform.

20050720 (appr): Read Li Yang's article online

Wondered if the author was reminding me to seize the opportunity to criticize Zhu so as to make friends with the Americans.

20050822: Globe cartoon

This cartoon attacked me for my silence on General Zhu's comments. US and Canadian govs knew that Chinese gov suggested that I criticize him to gain good will with the Americans.

20050824: My blog Summer Hibernation

With the usual sense of self-deprecating humor, I was back to regular blogging after a prolonged rest.

Had nothing to do with nuke.

Served as a political principle for the coming Canadian election.

20050825: U.S. media nuke

Bush administration de-classified documents revealing President Kennedy's plan to attack China with nuclear bombs in the '60s.

To me, because of the timing of this news, it was another piece of circumstantial evidence that Bush and Martin govs worked together to cover up the truth about Cecilia Zhang murder.

It was also an attempt to demonize me by tying me with nuke.

I thought that such attempt was ridiculous and I was able to brush it aside in my 2nd report with a sense of humor.

20050830: My blog Rein Zhu In

Accomplished a huge task.

Did not want to think about it again. (And in fact, did not, except when recounting it in my 2nd report, until mid-March.)

20060117: My 2nd report

My use of the quote, "All reactionaries are paper tigers", was applied in a specific context and had nothing to do with nuke.

20060124(appr.): Norman's Spectator

Noticed quite a few newspaper editorials on Canadian election used the word "reactionary" or its variants.

20060212: Read an article by a well-known Chinese dissident

Learned that nuke was at one time referred to as "paper tiger". Wondered if he was trying to tell me something.

20060217: Rumsfeld speech on fighting terrorism

Noticed he used the word "reactionary" or it variants.

Felt that Rumsfeld wanted to tie me with terrorism.

Still felt that to interpret "paper tiger" in my report as nuke was way, way far-fetched and indeed, malicious.

Mid-March: Travers' March 14 column

"Mr. Travers' misapprehension of my blog Summer hibernation was buried so deep in his March 14 column that it only dawned on me a couple of days later. At first I shook my head in denial. Then I got worried and I almost had an anxiety attack. Then I was angry. Then I was very depressed."

My thinking then was: "Upon careful examination, the only possible misapprehension appears to be that I was suggesting a nuclear winter (and making fun of it). A nuclear winter is the result of mutually-assured destruction (a term I only learned this week). But it's well-known that United States has a deciding advantage in term of nuclear capability. Therefore, this misapprehension was a bit far-fetched." (posted March 29)

Started paying attention to nuke issues.

What I learned about the Bomb after mid-March?

Having figure out the hidden message between the lines of Jim Travers' March 14 column, I was shocked by the Bush administration's interpretation of my blogs. With respect to my blog Summer Hibernation, Bush administration must have thought that not only did I believe that there is a nuclear balance between China and U.S. that would result in a mutually assured destruction (MAD), I was also approval of General Zhu's comments. Therefore, their release of a media nuclear bomb the following day was not just designed to demonize me, but (mostly) to try to get even with me with this hidden message: "We could have destroyed China's nuclear program in its infancy in the '60s when we had an absolute nuclear advantage."

Later, when I tried to follow the line of Bush administration's thinking in terms of interpreting the "controversial" quote I applied in my 2nd report, "All reactionaries are paper tigers", I became even more shocked. Bush administration must have thought the quote was my response to their media nuclear bomb because it was attributed to Mao Zedong, who was the leader of China at the time. Of course, as I outlined in the previous section, it did not cross my mind when I wrote the report that the Bomb was referred to as "paper tiger" by Mao.

However, thinking what Bush administration thinks helped me understand why Donald Rumsfeld was so upset at me as to try to tie me with terrorism in his February speech, by cracking nuts with the word "reactionary" or it variants. Bush administration thought that I had spelled out the truth that there is indeed a nuclear balance between China and U.S., a truth that was known to U.S. policy makers, but not to the American public.

This conclusion was reasonable. If Bush administration did not believe there is a nuclear balance between China and U.S., they should not have reacted with a media nuclear bomb to my blog Summer Hibernation. If they did not believe that there is a nuclear balance, Rumsfeld should not have been so upset at me because, as I see it, I had unwittingly spelled out the truth.

I knew Bush administration knew more than I did on Sino-U.S. nuclear relations. Therefore I thought their belief highly credible. But frankly, I was not totally convinced. My doubt came from the common knowledge that, with its astronomical military budget, U.S. has a big advantage in terms of military hardware. That's why I concluded in my previous "analysis" on March 29 that there is no MAD. I soon learned that's an amateurish mistake because there is something called "asymmetrical nuclear balance" that will still result in a MAD. The key is the ability to launch a second or a third strike in a nuclear war.

Fundamentally, my amateurish mistake was a result of my strong repulsion in dealing with this subject. Not only did I think anyone who contemplates using nuclear bombs is crazy, I also thought that anyone who justifies using them is the same. In light of my increased understanding of this topic, I think I owe an apology to those experts in this highly specialized and technical field.

I will give three examples of expert analysis of General Zhu's comments.

1. Professor Shen Dingli of Fudan University in Shanghai:

"With the Chinese leadership repeatedly stressing the Taiwan question as China's current core interest, it is natural to ask what is at China's disposal to defend this core interest. It is also logical to conclude that China will use any means to defend its core interests �C nuclear weaponry certainly being one such means." (China Security, Autumn 2005 Issue No.1)

2. Dr. Bruce Blair, Director of the World Security Institute in Washington, D.C., had this to say about General Zhu's comment:


“我认为(朱成虎的话)并不是威胁,而是在经过一个思考过程后得出的符合逻辑的结论。”布莱尔博士说,“朱将军对军事战略理论见解深刻,也是对新军事革命(RMA)非常博学的专家,所以他不可能避免下这样的结论:那就是(中美)军事力量的平衡如此倒向一方,在现在和可预料的未来,对付美国这样一个对手唯一有效的军事武器就是核武器。”(陈雅莉 ,《华盛顿观察》周刊 2005年第26期,7/20/2005)

3. Dr. Ben Tang, a researcher at Republican-linked Claremont Institute in California said on Channel-M's Interactive Program in the spring -Bush's low point in the development of my file - that General Zhu's comments had greatly reduced the likelihood of a military conflict between China and U.S. over Taiwan. (This is from my recollection as I did not record the show.)

In short, the logic behind General Zhu's comments is this: While weaponry is not the sole determinant of the outcome of a military conflict, there is no doubt that U.S. has a huge advantage over China in a conventional warfare. Since China's focus is on economical development, it's not a wise policy to throw money into an arms race with the U.S. Logically, the Chinese must have concluded a long time ago that the only effective deterrent against U.S. armed interference in Taiwan should come from building a strong nuclear arsenal, where China has a solid foundation going back to the '50s.

Coincidentally, I noticed during Chen Shui-bian's secession move last spring, that an unusually large quantity of media reports came out of China about their nuclear forces, such as articles about their "Great Wall Project", or about rocket launchers on high-speed trains, etc. (This April 4 article appeared to provide a good overview.) All these reinforced my logical conclusion that U.S. policy makers knew that there is indeed an (asymmetrical) nuclear balance between China and U.S.

Summary

Nuclear issue is such a toxic topic that I would never have paid close attention to it if not for my realization in mid-March how other people interpreted my writings. Yet for experts in this field, it is part of their job to contemplate those issues. I felt sad for them. And I felt sad for humanity. That's how I lost my sense of humor, perhaps my innocence too.