President Bush's comments on the dispute
First of all, I would like to point out that British Prime Minister Tony Blair was not the only politician who associated me with the incident of captured British soldiers. President Bush did so, too, in his only public comment on this incident on Saturday, March 31, when he made sure that his characterization of Iran's "inexcusable behavior" got reported everywhere.
People may have noticed that the word behavior was also used by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he criticized the U.S. government and wondered whether it was a coincident. I believe not. The use of word behavior by both leaders had its origin in my blog of October 27, 2006, in which I reiterated that my goal was, and still is, to be able to learn from Mr. Warren Buffett, and possibly more:
Asides from the many wild misinterpretations of this blog that I mentioned before, a few pundits, such as the editorialist at the New York Times who wrote The Great Divider on November 2, 2006 and James Travers of the Toronto Star in his November 4, 2006 column, saw that both of my desires to learn from Mr. Warren Buffett and to introduce him to the Chinese people are genuine (of course). And they both used the word behavior in their writings. For example, Mr. Travers wrote in his column: "Success and even survival are inseparably linked to difficult structural and behavioural changes only trusted leaders will be able to explain, sell and implement."Through both his life and his work, Mr. Buffett set an example for the whole world to follow. In particular, Chinese people can learn tremendously from him in their pursuit of economic transformation. Berkshire's economic principles of operation and Mr. Buffett's business philosophy represent the best of capitalism and will be extremely helpful in dealing with some of the "quality of development" issues that exist at this stage of China's economic development and in bringing China's global competitiveness to the next level.
Frankly, I think Mr. Travers' interpretation - if that was his interpretation - was a little too charitable. I do not regard myself as any kind of leader. As a Chinese saying goes: 榜样的力量是无穷的。I simply felt it right to introduce Warren Buffett to the Chinese people as they embrace market economy for the first time in their history.
My letter to President Ahmadinejad
My letter to Mr. Ahmadinejad on March 27 was actually the second one I wrote to world leaders. One week before that, I had sent a letter to the French President Jacques Chirac pleading for his help in bringing light to my situation.
As I said in my previous blog, my letter to the Iranian president was prompted by news reports of public speeches of both the Iranian president and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
On March 16, addressing himself to the members of the United Nations Security Council in a speech in the city of Tabas, Mr. Ahmadinejad reportedly said: "If you want to preserve your dignity in the international community you should change your behavior, because it will increase the revolutionary anger of the Iranian nation."
I shall note three points in this speech:
After my latest protest on March 13, the need to preserve my dignity became an even more urgent concern for me because, orchestrated by RCMP/CSIS behind the scenes, almost all parties involved in my legal proceedings have been motivated, from the very beginning, to not only discredit my underlying cause of fighting for justice for Cecilia Zhang, but also to inflict severe damage to my personal reputation and dignity.
The use of word behavior, as I discussed in the previous section.
The use of the word revolutionary, similar to Mr. Blair's "revolutionary communism" speech. The difference is that, while the Iranian's interpretation - if that was their interpretation - was a reflection of their own political belief, Mr. Blair's wildly oscillating interpretations, similar to those by Presidents Bush and Hu, were not coming from his conviction, but to serve a particular political agenda of the day. Still, if Mr. Ahmadinejad interpreted my writing that way, it was a concern for me because that's not what I meant. That's why in my letter to him, I emphasized that "I [did] not wish to see my writings be given all sorts of interpretations when they have nothing to do with politics". (The Iranians respected my wish, apparently. In the middle of the dispute on March 31, Iranian foreign minister said that the dispute should not be "politicized".)
On March 21, in referring to Iran's nuclear activities, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly said: "Until today, what we have done has been in accordance with international regulations. But if they take illegal actions, we too can take illegal actions and will do so."
The speech read like the Supreme Leader was justifying my protests of Cecilia Zhang murder, as I had explained my actions somewhat differently in my letter to President Chirac the day before: "… I would not have protested the ways I did if there were any other way I could have made my cause public." It was obvious that the Supreme Leader was sending a clear signal to me that Iranian government would help me in bringing my story to light. Since I desperately needed to get on the news, I responded by writing to Mr. Ahmadinejad on March 27. Indeed, I would have responded earlier had my preference not been for President Chirac to break my story.
Finally, I shall emphasize that if I could see the signals coming from the Iranians, so could everyone else who knows my story, including the Bush administration and Blair government. That's probably why Mr. Blair warned me to not respond to Iranian's signals by using the word fundamental in his comments on March 25. (The key distinction is that Iranian leaders' comments were made before the incident and in the context of their nuclear program, and Mr. Blair's comments were made in the context of the incident.)
Why would the Iranians want to help me?
Although I believe that bringing my story to light in itself is a right thing to do, I also believe Iran had an incentive to do so.
Since both of the speeches mentioned above by the two top leaders of Iran were made before the 15 British soldiers were captured, the Iranian's desire to help me was not motivated by expecting me to take side in this dispute. (I would not have been interested in doing so anyways. Besides, what did I know about such an incident thousands miles away?) These speeches were made in the context of Iran's nuclear program and during a period of intense negotiations among five permanent members of U.N. Security Council plus Germany on sanction proposals. My feeling was that it had something to do with the discussion of the new U.N.S.C. resolution where China was at the table.
What I did know at the time was that, after I published in early March my Chinese article, The inside story behind China's ASAT missile test, President Hu Jiantao owed his continued grip on power to two forces: (1) the various so-called interest groups mingled with the Chinese bureaucracy; and (2) U.S.-led Western governments. In return for Bush administration's propping him up, Mr. Hu likely moved China's position a lot closer to that of the United States during those discussions about Iran. That would certainly have caused some concern to the Iranians. Therefore, the Iranian's eagerness to help me was at least in part motivated by their desire to affect changes in China's internal politics.
理解以上两股势力为什么会支持胡锦涛并不困难。由于我在 3月初的《中国外空试验的内情》一文中披露了胡锦涛对政治改革不感兴趣，那些利益集团为了避免政治改革触动自己的既得利益当然会支持他。在同一篇文章中中我也指出，长久以来在我的事情上，胡锦涛跟布什本着他们之间的"共同利益"结成了统一战线。胡锦涛在那么多不光彩的事情被曝光之后，权力却没有受损，肯定是得到了这两股力量的支持。
其实，从冼岩 (胡锦涛 )最近的文章来看，他并不隐晦这一点。比方说，冼岩 (胡锦涛 )３月１７日的文章《美国政府改变中国政治游戏规则》就是专门透露这方面的信息的。他甚至将今天的中国跟晚清与民国时期的中国比。特别是下面的这段话，更露骨地说明了胡锦涛的权位是靠"官 + 商既得利益集团"和西方国家两股势力支撑的："在争论一方得到国际力量的政治支持及国内经济势力强力烘托的同时，另一方却只有干巴巴的理辩之声，只能依托于最不具博弈能力的弱势群体的利益，争论的结果其实早已不言而喻。"
在此我要说明的是，我当然赞成中国"融入主流国际社会"，但是我反对政治人物为了一己之私而不惜牺牲弱势群体的利益。要知道，目前中国最大的问题就是广大弱势群体在政治上没有声音。这也是政治改革需要解决的关键问题之一。只有解决了这个问题，中共才能成为一个真正代表中国最广大人民根本利益的党，并促进整个社会的公平正义、更好地构建和谐社会；也只有解决了这个问题，才能从根本上提高广大中低层群众的收入、福利和生活水平，实现经济增长方式由以劳动力价格优势为基础到以内需为基础的转型，同时从微观上就着眼缓和国际贸易的不平衡 ( 而不仅仅是在汇率上作文章) ；更只有解决了这个问题，才能为最终以用市场手段和行政手段并用的方式突破生态环境的瓶颈打下基础，实现经济长期可持续发展。
至于冼岩 (胡锦涛 )在其３月９日的文章《中国领导人没有政治改革的动力》中说，普通老百姓没有政改的迫切要求，这实际上正是因为没有人为这些弱势群体说话。其实，难道每年几十万起群体事件还不能说明他们要求的迫切性吗？如果等到官民矛盾激化到不可调和的时候才去启动政改，那时候可能就已经迟了。而且，政改不是一蹴而就的，其效果也不是立竿见影的，里面还包括温家宝总理常说的提高国民素质的任务，这是一个需要几代人共同努力才能完成的长期使命。
Sorry for the digression as I have not had an opportunity to respond to the many articles posted by 冼岩( 胡锦涛) since early March. Back to the Iranian issue. Although I was not privy to the details of the negotiations among U.N. five plus Germany, there was telltale sign from media reports confirming my conjecture that China moved its position a lot closer to that of the United States'. For example, one day before the scheduled U.N. vote, Iran requested a postponement because of visa problems with the U.S. The Chinese delegation, which normally exerted a moderating influence at the UN, roundly rejected Iran's request. Maybe Hu's government and Bush administration were afraid that, if the vote was postponed, I would have the opportunity to write to Mr. Ahmadinejad who would subsequently bring my story to light in his speech at UN.
Analysis
After Mr. Blair's comments on March 29 and 30 , it was clear to me that, by using the word fundamental in his comments of the incident on March 25, Mr. Blair sent me a warning that I should not get myself involved in the dispute. But why did he do that, knowing that I had nothing to do with the incident?
To see why he sent out the warning, I first ask the question: What could the impact be if I did get involved?
I certainly could not say that I knew the 15 British soldiers had intruded into the Iranian waters. As everyone who follows my story knows, I am a facts-and-logic kind of guy. And what did I know about such an incident thousands of miles away? Nothing, indeed. The only relevant impact would be on Chinese domestic politics. If, as a result of my writing to Mr. Ahmadinejad, he helped bring my story to light and President Hu Jintao was considerably weakened or forced out, China's foreign policy would just go back to its normal moderation. I could see in that scenario Chinese would continue to exert its moderating influence in the U.N. with respect to Iran's nuclear program, as it had always been doing. But I do not think Chinese government, even without Hu at the helm, would get involved in the dispute between Britain and Iran over the captured soldiers.
The plausible explanation was that Mr. Blair's warning me to stay away from the dispute reflected his own sense of insecurity in handling the on-going dispute with Iran. And his insecurity came from his knowledge of the fundamental issue of the dispute: the location of the 15 British soldiers at the time of the incident.
Perhaps a little grammatical analysis of Mr. Blair's comments is in order: "It is simply not true that they went into Iranian territorial waters and I hope the Iranian Government understands how fundamental an issue this is for us." Mr. Blair knew that the location of the 15 British soldiers at the time of their capture was the fundamental issue of the dispute. In other words, it was a fundamental issue for both sides. By consciously excluding the Iranian side from his comments, Mr. Blair revealed that he was in fact talking about something else, i.e., his side would attack my "fundamental character" if I got myself involved. Mr. Blair's insecurity indeed showed that an exact lie was the first half of his comments: "It is simply not true that they went into Iranian territorial waters…"
The above logical analysis was reinforced by Mr. Blair's repeated nuts-cracking after I posted my letter to Mr. Ahmadinejad. As everyone could see, my letter was actually biased against the Iranian side because I urged the Iranian president to free these soldiers as soon as possible even if they did enter into Iranian waters. Therefore, Mr. Blair could not possibly argue that I displayed a "fundamental character" problem - if there were such a thing - on this issue. His perplexing displeasure with my letter could only be explained with one thing, i.e., his own fear of the truth.
Besides, Mr. Blair's unhappiness with my being disgusted by the wildly oscillating interpretations of the Bush administration and President Hu - as I mentioned in my letter to Mr. Ahmadinejad - said that he was in fact defending Presidents Bush and Hu. One thing I learned about politics was that it often makes strange bedfellows. I guess the same is true of international politics. That's also why we heard on a number of occasions when Mr. Blair commented on the dispute, he claimed that the international community was on his side.
Of course, there was one (and only one) alternative scenario, i.e., those 15 British soldiers were captured in the Iraqi waters by intruding Iranian forces. But this scenario did not make much sense to me at all. Why would the Iranians deliberately provoke the West when they were faced with increased international isolation? If they wanted to seek conflict, wouldn't it better to do so when they had more international support? What possible benefits could there be by creating such an incident just one day before the scheduled U.N. vote on sanctions? Besides, that the Supreme Leader himself went to the front line to call for my response indicated that Iran's plan was to enhance international support on the diplomatic front, rather than to needle with force. Of course, their later unconditional release of these 15 soldiers simply confirmed that they did not seek to confront the West in the first place.
Therefore, in all likelihood, these 15 British soldiers did enter Iranian waters and Mr. Blair knew it. His nuts-cracking of my writings reflected his own fear of the truth.
Review of events
It is instructive to go over relevant events chronologically as I understand them now.
Early March: After my Chinese article, The inside story of China's ASAT missile test, in early March, President Hu's continued hold on power had considerable support from U.S.-led Western governments. See articles posted online by 冼岩 (胡锦涛 ) during this period of time.
March: During the negotiations among 5 U.N. permanent members plus Germany that led to the U.N.S.C. Resolution 1747 on March 24, China likely took an unusually close position to that of the United States as a return for Bush administration's support of President Hu's hold on power.
March 16 and 21: Top Iranian leaders sent me signals that they would help me in bringing my story to light in the hope that it would affect China's internal politics. On March 20, I had sent a letter to French President Jacques Chirac, asking for his help.
March 23: U.S. and U. K. took advantage of favorable international political environment and tried to instigate a war by having the 15 British soldiers intrude into Iranian waters. This event showed that the true aim of Bush administration's Iran policy had always been in favor of military strike.
March 23: Iran asked for a postponement of the sanction vote at U.N. Security Council because of visa problems with the U.S. China, together with other countries, roundly rejected Iran's request, probably fearing my writing to the Iranians before the vote.
March 25: Mr. Tony Blair warned me to not respond to Iranian's signals to help, but he did so in the context of captured British soldiers.
March 27: Out of desperate desire to free myself from my own unbearable situation in Canada, I cautiously responded to the Iranian's signals by sending a letter to Mr. Ahmadinejad.
March 29 and 30: In his comments about the dispute, Mr. Blair repeatedly used the word "disgust", a word I used in my letter to Mr. Ahmadinejad. His unhappiness with my letter, which was biased against the Iranian side, could only be explained with his own fear of the truth.
March 31: President Bush associated me with the dispute. Mr. Blair let his foreign minister Margaret Beckett be the public face in handling the dispute and Mrs. Beckett sounded a more conciliatory tone with me. But Mr. Blair's damage had already been done.
April 1: Pundits joined the spin. See, for example, Niall Ferguson's column on The Telegraph.
April 2: I posted two blogs and announced that there would be more to come.
April 3: Mr. Blair said that the next 48 hours would be "fairly critical", reflecting his estimation how long it would take for me to write my next blog. He also indicated that he would escalate even if I revealed what I knew. Iranian president also announced that he would postpone his scheduled news conference for a day, in an apparent anticipation of my next blog.
April 4: I did not publish my next blog for fear of being blamed for a likely escalation. To my relief and to the apparent surprise of Mr. Blair and his government, President Ahmadinejad released the 15 British soldiers. Iranian's move indicated that they did not seek to confront the British.
April 4: After learning that the soldiers would be freed, Mr. Blair spoke, through the media, to the Iranian people: "We bear you no ill will." It sounded awfully like an apology to me. He also said that he respected Iran's history and culture, mimicking my usual moderation in my letter. (What's left unsaid in my letter was, of course, my concern that my writings might have been misinterpreted by the Iranians). I would say Mr. Blair was very afraid at that moment. Indeed, he did not show any sign of relief when he made his statement in front of camera.
April 5: Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox reportedly asked the following questions about the incident:
Why the 15 personnel were so far away from HMS Cornwall?
Why the ship's radar did not detect their Iranian captors?
Why the Lynx helicopter did not stay with them?
Early April: Although Mr. Tony Blair later publicly distanced himself from his government's decision to let the freed soldiers sell their stories �C essentially calling it a bad "idea", another word in my letter to Mr. Ahmadinejad - the decision itself certainly was made out of propaganda considerations. Has it succeeded? Although I have not had time to follow up in this front, I don't think it could. Truth is a very stubborn thing.
April 14: Ms. Margaret Beckett wrote on The Daily Telegraph claiming that it was diplomacy that had saved the 15 British soldiers. Yet she gave no details to back up her claim.
